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11 Introduction
Whether or not there has been a break in trade among Euro-Area countries
after the adoption of the Euro, and, if so, what is responsible for it, remains
a puzzle. Yet, it is a particularly interesting puzzle; one worth trying to
solve. In the policy world, debates in accession countries often center around
the expansionary e ects of a common currency. In the academic realm, the
recent adoption of the Euro is perceived by many as a natural experiment to
test the famous hypothesis in Rose (2000) that a common currency increases
trade by a formidable factor, all other things equal.
On the empirical side, papers that have tackled the issue have left the
door open for more conclusive research. Most papers ﬁnd a trade e ect,
but their conclusions are weakened by imprecise econometric techniques,
rooted in test statistics whose asymptotic properties cannot be supported
by the very few data-points available after the Euro’s introduction. Mancini-
Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) propose a more rigorous procedure, based on a
formal end of sample test for panel data, building a distribution for the test
statistic using parametric subsampling techniques. That paper generally
corroborates the ﬁndings in the literature by rejecting the null of stability
in trade between Euro-Area countries at the 10 - 1% level. Yet, the break
seems to be short-lasting, spanning only 10 quarters (2.5 years) after its
emergence in 1999 Q1.
But if a break does exist, what is really responsible for the increase in
trade? What is the channel linking a common currency to export activity?
The test in Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) is a residual based test,
leading to a rejection of the null hypothesis of coe cient stability if the post-
break errors are especially large under the null. Thus, the conclusion that
a break exists may be the result of running the gravity regression on a mis-
speciﬁed model. This begs the question: what other variables, if any, should
be part of the regression and do these help explain the break? Mancini-
Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) take a ﬁrst step in exploring an augmented
gravity speciﬁcation. The paper expands the regression model to include
a term capturing political and institutional integration among Euro-Area
countries. This follows the argument advanced by Nitsch (2002) and Nitsch
and Berger (2005). Indeed, when controlling for this factor, there no longer
exists evidence of a break in trade.
Although a promising explanation, the political and institutional inte-
gration story is limited in three main ways. First, the break in trade is found
around 1999 Q1, while European integration received a signiﬁcant boost in
1992 with the signing of the Maastricht treaty. Time to build lags and a
ramping up of the ratiﬁcation and integration process may account for the
di erence, but timing is still somewhat questionable. Second, the break ap-
pears short-lasting, while political and institutional integration is instead a
long-lasting and relatively smooth process. At least, the process in Europe
2su ered no major setbacks in the 2001-2002 timeframe, when the break in
trade seems to vanish. Third, the series for political and institutional in-
tegration, although borrowed from Berger Nitsch and developed with care,
remains subjective and di cult to cross check. Given these hesitations, it is
therefore still worth looking for other candidate explanations for the break
in trade.
This paper points to a novel explanation based on real interest rates.
From an empirical standpoint, the explanation seems promising. Real in-
terest rates decreased substantially across Euro-Area countries, as a pre-
condition and result of the Euro’s introduction. Furthermore, their down-
ward trend was short-lasting, while even exhibiting an upward correction
in the 2001-2002 timeframe. Furthermore, as this paper will show, real in-
terest rates seem to be correlated to trade with a signiﬁcant and negative
coe cient over the last twenty ﬁve years in Europe. Thus, real interest rates
may be the missing variable in the gravity regression, or the link between
the Euro and the perceived rise in trade.
This paper builds a simple model to explain this link and thereby pro-
vides microfoundations for an augmented gravity equation. The model is
centered on endogenous ﬁrm entry, responding to a ﬁxed cost of entry de-
pendent on interest rates. The model ﬁts with a story that ﬁrms must
borrow funds at the ongoing real interest rate to set up or expand a costly
export business, or with the explanation that exporting requires investment
in capital whose rental cost depends on the real interest rate. Either way,
the model shows that as interest rates decrease, more ﬁrms enter the market
for exports, while increasing investment spending and ultimately boosting
trade. A key factor in this model is the assumption that interest rates
are set exogenously, as in Flam and Helpman (1987), or as is typical in a
small open economy. The model remains simple, drawing its inspiration
from Chatterjee and Cooper (1993), and, easily lends itself to provide an
augmented gravity equation to test for a break in Euro-Area trade.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o ers a relatively detailed
review of the literature on the microfoundations for gravity equations, as well
as on explanations commonly given for the link between a common currency
and trade. The section ends with a brief reference to papers emphasizing
the role of ﬁxed entry costs in trade ﬂuctuations and hinting speciﬁcally
at the e ect of interest rates. Section 3 focusses on empirical evidence,
discussing recent trends in Euro-Area interest rates and substantiating the
link between interest rates and trade. Section 4 then introduces the model
discussed above, ending with an augmented gravity equation. Section 5
tests this equation and concludes that, indeed, evidence for a break in trade
disappears when controlling for interest rates. Finally, section 6 concludes.
32 Inspiration from the literature
2.1 Traditional microfoundations for the gravity equation
It is surprising that the gravity equation was so extensively used in empirical
work without any allusion to rigorous microfoundations until the work of
Anderson and van Wincoop in 2003. Maybe gravity regressions ﬁt the data
so well that researchers did not see the value of digging for foundations. Yet,
Baldwin (2006) shows that the exercise of anchoring the gravity equation in
a theoretical model is instructive: among other beneﬁts, it helps emphasizes
the limitations and errors evident in much of the early empirical literature.1
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) were the ﬁrst to explicitly build a
microfounded model for the gravity equation in a simple and elegant paper2.
They begin with a CES demand function for the sale of goods from country
i to country j. But their equation involves the unobservable price pi of
the homogeneous good sold from country i. To overcome this hurdle, they
consider an additional equation to substitute for pi: the market clearing
equation which captures the fact that country i’s output is the sum of the
sale of country i’s goods to all trading partners, including itself. After
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where xi,j is the demand for country i’s goods in country j (equivalently the
export of country i to country j), y are domestic GDP, yw is the sum of all
countries’ GDP,  i,j is the cost of trade between countries i and j,   is the
elasticity of substitution between goods consumed in country j (assumed
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where K is the number of trading partners.
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call this price index the “multilateral
trade resistance term”, as it captures a sort of average trade barrier between
country j and all its trading partners. Importantly, the above equations
show that for a given bilateral trade barrier between i and j, given by  i,j,
the higher is country j’s multilateral trade resistance term, the lower will
1Baldwin (2006) gives an illuminating overview of the literature’s main ﬁndings, hy-
potheses and notably mistakes - “gold, silver and bronze medals” - that are typically
found.
2Other, more recent, papers o er variations of the gravity speciﬁcations, such as Red-
ding and Venables (2004).
4be relative prices from country i and thus the higher will be imports from
country i.
Indeed, the intuition inherent in the “multilateral trade resistance” term
comes from considering trade costs in relative terms. As Baldwin (2006)
points out, a naive gravity equation would predict very low trade between
New Zealand and Australia, for instance, due to the considerable distance
that separates these two countries. Yet, in relative terms, this distance
is merely a fraction of that separating the two countries from their other
trading partners. Thus, a gravity equation taking relative prices into account
ﬁts the data much more accurately.3
In constructing microfoundations, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
therefore not only provided a more tractable model, but also brought new
variables to the forefront of the debate. Indeed, relative GDP and prices had
been overlooked in prior empirical work, a fact that Baldwin (2006) qualiﬁes
as the “gold medal error” of the early Rose (2000) legacy. Appropriately, the
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) paper immediately gave rise to the no-
table contributions of Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Anderson and van
Wincoop (2001)4, each re-estimating the e ects of a common currency on
trade using relative measures of prices and GDP. The ﬁrst paper essentially
correcting Rose’s (2000) seminal contribution, and the second focussing on
the role of borders on trade. In both cases, though, a substantial trade e ect
persists.
2.2 What in a common currency could cause the break in
trade?
Anderson and van Wincoop’s (2003) model signiﬁcantly modernized gravity
estimations, yet, in its ﬁnal form, the regression equation remains too bare
to accurately pin-point the causality linking a common currency to trade.
The most widely cited reasons for this link are twofold: (i) eliminated ex-
change rate volatility, and (ii) eradicated currency related transaction costs.
Note that the argument advanced by Nitsch (2002) and Nitsch and Berger
(2005), discussed in this paper’s introduction, regarding the importance of
institutional and political integration, is separate and can even be seen as
independent of the adoption of a common currency. Of the two channels
pointed out above, the second is likely to be the weakest, especially among
the relatively well-functionning European capital markets, yet is arguably
the only one captured by the gravity equation of Anderson and van Wincoop
3See Baldwin (2006) for a simpliﬁed derivation of the Anderson and van Wincoop
gravity equation and an extensive discussion of the intuition behind their model.
4The dates on these papers may appear anachronistic, but the Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) paper appeared several years earlier as a working paper and immediately
became inﬂuential.
5(2003), speciﬁcally by the trade cost term  i,j.5
A large literature has developed around the ﬁrst channel, that of cur-
rency volatility or risk, and trade. The most notable theoretical contribu-
tion linking this channel to the gravity model is Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2000). This paper presents a general equilibrium model of trade rooted in
a CES demand-gravity equation to evaluate the long debated question of
the e ects of currency volatility on trade.6 Appropriately, their conclusions
summarize the ﬁndings inherent in the older literature - both theoretical and
empirical: the e ect of lower exchange rate volatility on trade is ambiguous.
An extensive review of the empirical literature can be found in Cote (1994),
McKenzie (2000), H.M. Treasury (2003) and IMF (2004). The general ver-
dict is that some papers ﬁnd a positive e ect, although weak, while most
ﬁnd no signiﬁcant or consistent e ect. To a certain extent, results seem to
hinge on the particular deﬁnition of volatility.
From a theoretical perspective, the general equilibrium framework is es-
pecially useful to explain this ambiguity. Traditional wisdom has it that a
currency appreciation will lead to lower exports, as domestic goods become
more expensive abroad. But variations in exchange rates are often accompa-
nied by changes in macro-economic factors that can have counter-balacing
e ects on trade. For instance, Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000) suggest
that a country’s exchange rate appreciation with respect to one of its trad-
ing partners has a negative impact on exports through relative prices. Yet,
if the appreciation is driven by a monetary expansion abroad, it could be
coupled by an increase in import demand from the foreign country.
The opposing forces pointed out in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2000)
are especially true if the degree of pricing to market is high, since the usual
expenditure switching channel will be under-utilized. In fact, the literature
on limited passthrough, or pricing to market, o ers further support for the
murky relationship between currency movements and trade.7 Indeed, when
passthrough is low, a monetary expansion, although inducing a deprecia-
tion of the currency, can lead to improvements in terms of trade. Relative
list prices do not change, but the home country will make more money in
terms of domestic currency from the sale of its exports (once it repatriates
revenues made in the appreciated foreign currency). This will naturally
have “prosper-thy-self” e ects, and possibly “prosper-the-neighbor” reper-
cussions as well, since higher domestic revenues will translate in greater
imports.
5And even then, the argument is weak, as transaction costs due to the conversion and
accounting of multiple currencies is likely to be a ﬁxed cost, not a variable cost as is  i,j.
6Other papers mainly consider a partial equilibrium analysis, such as Obstfeld and
Rogo  (1998).
7See, for instance, Betts and Devreux (2000) for a theoretical model of pricing to
market and Campa and Goldberg (2002, 2005) or Gagnon and Ihrig (2004) for empirical
estimates of the degree of pass-through for the US economy.
6Partial equilibrium papers also o er a slew of explanations for why ex-
change rate volatility may not always hurt trade: ﬁrms can hedge using
ﬁnancial instruments, ﬁrms selling in multiple countries beneﬁt from a nat-
ural hedge when currencies move in opposite direction, ﬁrms beneﬁt from
some o set of exchange rate movements by importing intermediate products
from countries to which they export and ﬁnally time may o er a natural
hedge, as exchange rate volatility can bring both painful appreciations and
helpful depreciations over a medium term horizon.8
The only remaining argument for the link between exchange rate changes
and trade would be that merely reducing volatility does not impact trade,
but eradicating potential spikes in volatility makes a big di erence. Such
non-linearity (non-di erentiability) would arise if it were the threat of a
large and sudden currency crisis or major re-alignment that hampered trade,
and not higher frequency movements. In this case, only the adoption of
a common currency would credibly avoid this risk. We acknowledge this
argument (which is relatively rare in the literature), although do not pursue
it further given the extreme di culty of testing it, as agents’ expectations of
future re-alignments are not revealed. None-the-less, the general equilibrium
arguments advanced above still hold, even in the face of one-time and large
currency movements, suggesting that risk of re-alignment should not impact
trade signiﬁcantly.
Thus, the ﬁrst channel linking a common currency and trade, namely
exchange rate volatility, remains relatively weak. We therefore leave aside
the task of augmenting the basic Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) gravity
equation with a model of exchange rate volatility.
2.3 The recent literature: ﬁxed costs and interest rates
In our search for another channel linking a common currency to trade, and
for an augmented gravity equation to test it against the break in Euro-Area
trade, we ﬁnd hints in the recent trade literature, emphasizing the e ects of
ﬁxed entry costs.
On the empirical side, two papers are particularly worth noting: Bernard
and Jensen (2004) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004). Both papers
look in details at ﬁrm level trade data and epitomize the growing body
of micro-level empirical trade studies that have emerged recently. Their
conclusions took the ﬁeld by surprise: a large portion of trade ﬂuctuations
seems to come from the entry (or exit) of new ﬁrms in the export business.
8If anything, another strand of papers hints that the correlation between trade ﬂuctua-
tions and currency volatility ought to be low, without referring to e ects on trade volume,
though. Papers like Franke (1991) and Sercu and Vanhulle (1992), forecast greater inertia
of ﬁrm entry into, and exit from, the export market due to the correlation of the option
value of waiting to make a move with currency volatility. This idea ﬁnds its roots in Dixit
and Pindyck (1982)
7Within-sector ﬁrm reallocations, the so called “extensive margin” resulting
from both entry and exit, had been overlooked until recently as a major
driver of trade.
Baldwin and Taglioni (2004), in particular, use these facts as a spring
board for their microfounded model of a common currency’s e ect on trade,
which stands as one of the very few, yet extremely useful, e orts to grasp
exactly what in a common currency could a ect trade. They postulate that
as exchange rate volatility decreases, small and medium sized ﬁrms that did
not have the means of protecting themselves on ﬁnancial markets will start
exporting, thus accounting for the sudden increase in trade following the
adoption of a common currency. We will stray away from this model’s em-
phasis on exchange rate volatility, for the reasons mentioned earlier, but will
retain the fundamental notion that the endogenously determined number of
exporting ﬁrms, dependent on a ﬁxed entry cost, is a key variable explain-
ing trade patterns. Baldwin (2006) makes the same remark, suggesting that
of the variables entering the gravity equation, a rise in n, the number of
exporting ﬁrms in a given country, is likely to be the key to explain trade
creation.
A recent strand of the trade literature (commonly referred to as the
“new, new trade theory”) initiated by the seminal work of Marc Melitz
(2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), places substantial
emphasis on ﬁxed trade costs. This feature, in addition to the assumption of
ﬁrm heterogeneity, endogenously determines aggregate productivity, price,
output and most importantly, the number of ﬁrms able to engage in trade. In
these models, a ﬁrm considering entry evaluates its expected ﬂow of proﬁts
over the uncertain realization of its productivity against its ﬁxed entry costs.
The decision to enter a market - based on a net present value calculation -
is therefore explicitly akin to an investment decision. Consequently, interest
rates play an important role in discounting future proﬁts. But even if the
model in Melitz (2003) has been used as a basis to specify gravity-type
equations of trade (see Helpman, Melitz, Rubinstein (2004)), the particular
e ect of interest rates has so far not been emphasized.
But interest rates do not just enter the story on the side of expected
proﬁts. In fact, interest rates are also intimately tied to the ﬁxed costs of
entering the export market or expanding one’s foreign operations. These
costs typically include having to adapt one’s products to foreign speciﬁ-
cations, enlarge a plant, open an assembly line abroad, engage in R&D,
undertake market research, or possibly hire a foreign workforce. To ﬁnance
these costs, ﬁrms generally borrow the funds at the ongoing interest rate
and compare these ﬁnancing costs to the net present value of proﬁts of their
new project. Another way to see the link between entry costs and inter-
est rates is to view the requirements to enter, or expand operations in, the
export market as dependent on capital expenditures. Indeed, logistics, pro-
duction, product adaptations or just maintaining an o ce abroad are all
8capital intensive activities, for which the relevant cost is the interest rate.
The model presented later in this paper will in fact choose the latter
approach, namely of emphasizing the link between entry costs and interest
rates through capital expenditures. First, this assumption engenders the
most straightforward model and o ers the most direct mapping to an aug-
mented gravity equation. Indeed, considering a corporate bond market to
capture the borrowing of ﬁrms would introduce issues of risk aversion and
market completeness, while future proﬁts rest on expectations of interest
rate movements. But in fact, focussing on the net present value of proﬁts
or entry costs ends up being the same from the ﬁrm’s point of view. The
ratio of the two can be seen as representing Tobin’s q. So independently of
which moves with interest rates, as long as the ratio increases, ﬁrms decide
to enter the export market, thereby making the two modeling approaches
isomorphic. But, actually, it may be more sensible to focus on entry costs,
since expected proﬁts are hard to measure and are usually expressed with
a large fork. Instead, costs of entry are much more tangible and immediate
to ﬁrm managers and thus more likely to be sensitive to changes in interest
rates.
The close link between the cost of entry and the number of ﬁrms in
a market resonates with a related IO literature, surprisingly absent from
the references in the “new, new trade” papers. In his book Sunk Costs
and Market Structure (1991), John Sutton focusses, in part, on the role
of exogenous sunk costs in determining industry concentration.9 He very
clearly lays out a theory by which concentration, or the number of ﬁrms in a
given industry, is a positive function of market size and a negative function
of set-up, or sunk, costs. This relationship ﬁts industries where goods are
homogeneous or horizontally di erentiated (as in Shaked and Sutton, 1987)
and is supported by a very comprehensive set of case studies.
3 Evidence in favor of interest rates
The above considerations suggest that it may indeed be reasonable to build
a model linking interest rates to ﬁxed entry costs, and, in turn, to trade
movements through the number of exporting ﬁrms. But before proceeding
to build a theoretical model, it is important to check if the relationship holds
empirically. In particular, could interest rates be the missing variable in
the baseline trade regression model of Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006)?
For a variable to explain the break in trade, it must exhibit a noticeable
movement across all Euro-Area countries during the time of the break and
must be correlated to trade. We investigate both aspects in turn.
9The most relevant chapters are 2, 5, 6 and 7.
93.1 The path of interest rates
Because of the various convergence criteria to enter a monetary union, real
interest rates in the Euro-Area have not been stationary over the last ten
years, as would otherwise be expected. In particular, there has been a
marked decrease and convergence in interest rates among the eventual Euro-
Area countries starting around 1996.
Figure 1 shows how Euro-Area average real interest rates (over six quar-
ters) were relatively stable (just below 10%) until about 1996, when a notice-
able downward trend began.10 In four years, real interest rates lost about
600 basis points, and four years later, after a further 200 basis point de-
crease, were at their lowest, around 2%. Note that a posteriori, it may seem
like interest rates have been decreasing steadily since 1982, with a large
correction between 1988 and 1996. But during the cycle, it must not have
been clear that interest rates were going to move below their historical av-
erage of about 10% until about 1996. Figure 2 corroborates this ﬁnding by
showing how year-on-year growth in average interest rates hovered slightly
below zero until about 1996, after which it remained decisively negative, in
the ballpark of  10% or more.
The decrease in real interest rates were a product of the convergence
criteria for the Euro, but also probably of more solidly anchored inﬂation
expectations following the transfer of power to the ECB, away from the
national banks whose reputation for independence su ered throughout the
80s and early 90s, in many cases. The temptation for central banks to use
monetary policy to favor short term growth for the convenience of succeeding
governments was going to be eradicated.
Thus, the signiﬁcant, ongoing and believable decrease in real interest
rates that marked Euro-Area countries was the result of deep macro-economic
transformations which we hypothesize had a structural impact on a wide
range of activities, including trade.
3.2 The correlation between interest rates and trade
The link between interest rates and trade can be tested empirically. Because
interest rates as well as the value of trade exhibit unit roots11, we use the
DOLS procedure for our regression to obtain non-biased coe cients and
correct standard errors.12 We refer to model A as the baseline model in
Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) for comparison, and to model C as a
10The average of six quarters is used in line with the structural break tests done later,
although robustness of these results is checked by using di erent lag structures of interest
rates.
11More details on this feature are presented later when discussing the structural break
test.
12See Baltagi and Kao (2000) for more details, or appendix A for an overview of the
DOLS procedure.
10regression equation containing the standard output and real exchange rate
variables, as in model A, as well as interest rates and wages. The latter is
included for reasons that will become apparent only after the introduction
of our model, but for now, it can be seen as controlling for another factor
price, mirroring the introduction of interest rates in the regression. Note
that interest rates enter as an average of six, four and two quarters, to
reﬂect the fact that ﬁrms making decisions on the basis of interest rates will
respond to trends, or averages, rather than spot rates.
Our results for the DOLS regressions are illustrated in table 7. The
coe cients and signs on the long run cointegrated variables appear as ex-
pected and match those found in similar studies in the relevant literature.
The coe cient on GDP (both domestic and foreign) is positive and sig-
niﬁcant. That on real exchange rates is negative (a depreciation causes
a decrease in imports), but hardly signiﬁcant (as in Micco, Ordo˜ nez and
Stein, 2003). Average interest rates appear as negative and signiﬁcant, with
a rather small magnitidue (indicating a realistic relationship between inter-
est rates and trade: a decrease of 1% in interest rates increase trade by
0.07-0.1%). It is also encouraging to see that the inclusion of interest rates
does not markedly change the coe cients on GDP, thereby underscoring
that there do not seem to be problems of multicollinearity among our re-
gressors, or alternatively that interest rates a ect trade through a channel
other than just consumption tilting. The only surprise at ﬁrst glance is
the magnitude and signiﬁcance level of wages. But these can be attributed
to the high degree of correlation between wages and trade, both smooth,
upward sloping series.
Table 8 reports coe cients from the error correction model. The coe -
cients are as expected in terms of magnitude and sign, mainly corroborating
the above results. This time, changes in wages now appear to have a more
realistic magnitude, and are no longer signiﬁcant. This is rather expected as
there has been very little high frequency variation in real wages within the
EU in the last twenty years. More importantly, average interest rates again
exhibit a negative sign and realistic proportions. Note that the t-stats are
reported for indicative purposes only, as they do not feature robust stan-
dard errors (unlike those in the DOLS procedure that explicitly corrects for
cointegrated variables).
Thus, empirical evidence suggests that interest rates are a prime candi-
date to explain the link between a common currency and trade, given both
the signiﬁcant and wide-ranging movement in interest rates around the time
of the Euro’s introduction, and the correlation existing between interest
rates and trade.
114 The model
4.1 Intuition, setup and summary
The purpose of building a model linking interest rates to trade is twofold.
First, it is to crystalize an explanation for the empirical regularities noted
above, and capture some of the key features noted earlier in the literature
review, namely the importance of ﬁxed production costs depending on inter-
est rates. The second goal is to serve as microfoundations for an augmented
gravity equation, similar to that in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) or
any of the prominent studies testing for a common currency e ect (see Bald-
win, 2006, for a literature review). We therefore aim for a class of models
simple enough to translate easily into a gravity equation when linearized.
To do so, we draw inspiration mainly from Chatterjee and Cooper (1993),
instead of the more recent Ghironi and Melitz (2004), or Bilbiie, Ghironi
and Melitz (2005).13 The two sets of papers share many of the same fea-
tures, but the latter introduces dynamics, by considering a time to build
lag after investment takes place, as well as a one-time sunk cost. As our
goal is to ﬁnd guidance for empirical testing, and not numerical simulation,
we draw inspiration essentially from the former model, assuming frictionless
and immediate entry, as well as period-by-period ﬁxed costs, as if the entry
decision had to be renewed every period.14
The other key ingredients to the model are the following. We assume that
all ﬁrms are homogenous and engage in trade. We will be concerned with
the number of ﬁrms in the trade business, and simply assume that incoming
ﬁrms are drawn from a pool of existing, potential entrants. Furthermore,
the period-by-period ﬁxed cost that ﬁrms have to pay to remain in the
export market absorb both labor and capital from the economy; the latter
is essential to link entry costs to interest rates, as discussed in the earlier
literature review. Importantly, we consider interest rates to be exogenous,
while capital is endogenous and supplied perfectly elastically, as in Flam
and Helpman (1987) or as is typical in a small open economy.15 Labor,
13Devreux, Head and Lapham (1996a,b) develop models similar to those in Chatterjee
and Cooper (1993). These papers were written at a time when monopolistic competition
was being introduced in macro-economics; the papers’ primary goal was to study how
market power in product markets a ected the response of the economy to exogenous
shocks (mainly productivity). I am thankful to Rebelo (2002) for a refreshingly clear
introduction to these class of models. Some of the notation that follows is drawn from
Rebelo (2002).
14It is interesting to note that in their conclusion, Chatterjee and Cooper suggest that
“one extension... would be to add a lag in the entry process... [and] a speciﬁcation in
which there is a ﬁxed cost of entry separate from the ﬁxed cost of production”, as if
foreshadowing exactly what would come about ten years later in the dynamic models
stemming from Melitz (2003).
15This assumption is all the more realistic in our case, as a decrease in real interest rates
was dictated as one of the accession criteria to the Euro.
12instead, is ﬁxed and is assumed to be supplied with a vertical schedule; we
thus assume full employment. Finally, the number of ﬁrms is endogenous
and satisﬁes, each period, a free entry condition such that proﬁts are zero.
Note that this condition is similar to that in Ghironi and Melitz (2004),
but since we consider period-by-period ﬁxed costs, the free entry condition
equates current proﬁts to current ﬁxed costs, instead of the net present value
of future proﬁts; this feature greatly simpliﬁes our analysis.
In a nutshell, as interest rates diminish, ﬁxed costs decline, more ﬁrms are
able to enter the market, and all ﬁrms increase capital investment, two forces
that boost total exports. Behind the scene, several features are at play: as
interest rates decrease, lower market access costs increase the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms in the market. Also, ﬁrms substitute capital for labor in
production, thus freeing up workers to serve the newly entering ﬁrms. In the
aggregate, labor will have remained ﬁxed, but capital will have increased,
thus assuring that total output, or trade, also increases.
Note that changes in interest rates would play a much more secondary
role in traditional models of trade without ﬁxed costs, where changes in fac-
tor prices would only have marginal e ects on ﬁrms’ production decisions. In
such models, lower interest rates would favor capital intensive ﬁrms (presum-
ably producing more di erentiated goods), thus increasing intra-industry
trade, but only marginally. On the contrary, the introduction of ﬁxed costs
has the hope of magnifying the e ects of interest rates through market entry
or exit.
4.2 The model
We begin, as in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), with the usual CES
demand equation, which, for simplicity, we present for the aggregate con-
sumption in country i of varieties imported from country j:
Ci,j,t =






where   is the elasticity of substitution between varieties16 and nj,t is the
number of active ﬁrms in country j (equivalently the number of di erentiated
varieties). For simplicity, we drop the time subscripts in the derivations
below.
This gives rise to the usual demand for each variety of country j in





   
1  
Ci
We also report the equivalent equation in values, which will be more
useful to us in the our empirical work. We simply remark that the value of
16  > 1, and the more   is away from 1, the more the goods are di erentiated, or
imperfect substitutes.









where Yi = PiCi, where Pi is the aggregate price index deﬁned later.
Furthermore, we assume the standard full pass-through pricing condition
as well as PPP, such that:




where  i,j is the nominal exchange rate between countries i and j speciﬁed
as the price in j’s currency of one unit of i’s currency.
Finally, assuming that ﬁrms are homogenous in production technology,
aggregate demand (in value terms) for country j’s varieties in country i,
Vi,j, is nj · vi,j, where nj is the number of varieties or ﬁrms in country j.
This relation gives rise to the following basic demand equation (or equation













The remainder of the model will mostly aim to determine nj and in par-
ticular link nj to Rj, the real interest rate in country j. This procedure
resembles the approach in Baldwin (2006) when outlining the microfounda-
tions of Flam and Nordstr¨ om’s (2003) gravity speciﬁcation. Indeed, Baldwin
(2006) solves for the number of exporting ﬁrms as a function of real GDP
then plugs this result back into the CES demand equation.
Firms’ production function can be summarized by a Cobb-Douglas equa-
tion:
xj = A(Kj   ¯ K)1  (Lj   ¯ L)  (4)
where ¯ K and ¯ L are the ﬁxed costs needed to operate; as speciﬁed earlier,
these act like an overhead by deviating resources away from production,
similarly to Ghironi and Melitz (2004) or Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
who deﬁne entry costs as a function of labor.
Straightforward cost minimization subject to the production of amount
xj, the wage rate wj and the interest rate Rj, yields the optimal utilization
of capital and labor:
Kj = ¯ K +




Lj = ¯ L +
(Rj/wj)1  ( /(1    ))1  
A
xj (6)
14In turn, this yields the following non-homogeneous cost function:








(1    )1    xj (7)
where TC stands for total costs.
We therefore see very clearly that costs can be separated into a ﬁxed
part Rj ¯ K + wj ¯ L and a remaining variable part. For simplicity, we call the
ﬁrst a0 and the second a1, both of which, as expected, vary positively with
factor prices. We can therefore write the ﬁrm’s optimal price as:
pj =  a1 (8)
as is usual in the CES case, where   is the elasticity of substitution between
goods and also represents the ﬁxed markup over the marginal cost a1.
Firms are assumed to enter the market freely, until proﬁts are zero for
all ﬁrms. Entry is frictionless and instantaneous, in the way that there is
no lag separating entry from production, contrarily to Ghironi and Melitz
(2004) or Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005). The zero proﬁt or free entry
condition, which holds at every period, helps determine the number of ﬁrms
that can remain active in the market. In particular, this condition speciﬁes
that   = 0 at equilibrium, where   are proﬁts per ﬁrm. We therefore write
that at equilibrium:
  = pjxj   a0   a1xj = 0
or
(pj   a1)xj = a0 (9)
namely, operating proﬁts equal ﬁxed costs. As mentioned earlier, this is
the instantaneous version of the zero proﬁt condition in Ghironi and Melitz
(2004) or Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
Importantly, this condition allows us to solve xj:
xj =
a0(Rj)
(    1)a1(Rj)
  x (10)
where we added (Rj) to emphasize the dependence on interest rates.
Thus, xj, each ﬁrm’s output, is ﬁxed in equilibrium by the free entry
condition. Note that interest rates do not cancel out, although they appear
both in the numerator and the denominator, as substitution towards or away
from capital is not allowed in ﬁxed costs, but only in variable costs. Thus,
changes in Rj a ect the amount of ﬁrm output. This is as in Flam and
Helpman (1987). We will analyze this result more closely later when in a
position to study the contemporaneous e ect on the number of ﬁrms.
For now, to build intuition for this result, it is worth looking into greater
detail at the mechanism linking the number of ﬁrms and proﬁts: the ag-
gregate price index. Indeed, the aggregate price depends negatively on the
15number of ﬁrms. As is usual in the CES setting, the price index is the power
mean of prices of each variety taken over all trading partners s   {0,S}:
Pj =






1  di ds
 1  
where the inner integral is taken over all ﬁrms, ns, in country s and where
pj,s(i) captures the price of variety i from country s in country j. This
expression simpliﬁes, since the price pj,s(i) is the same for all ﬁrms in s.
This yields:
Pj =






 1  
where we clearly see that the aggregate price decreases with ns (recall, 1  
  < 0). Appropriately, this link is commonly referred to as the variety e ect
and is central to explaining the zero proﬁt condition. As more ﬁrms enter
the market, aggregate prices decrease. Since a ﬁrm’s demand function is a
negative function of aggregate prices (relative prices matter), each ﬁrm sells
less. Operating proﬁts for a given ﬁrm, (   1)a1x, thus decrease until they
are equal to a0, the ﬁxed cost of operation, and ﬁrms stop entering. Thus,
the zero proﬁt condition determines the output of each ﬁrm.
At this point, the labor market clearing condition allows us to ﬁnd the
number of active ﬁrms in the market. Intuitively, if ﬁrm output is ﬁxed and
total labor is given, the number of ﬁrms able to survive in the market is
determined by total labor divided by the number of workers employed by
each ﬁrm. The approach of using the labor market clearing condition as an
additional constraint to solve for the number of ﬁrms is shared with Bilbiie,
Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
More formally, the labor market clears when
 
nj L(i)di = Ej where Ej
is the amount of workers available in country j and L(i) is the amount of






To close the model, we use the equation for ﬁrm output (10) and the
equation determining optimal labor demand per ﬁrm (6), to solve for Lj.
We ﬁnd:
Lj = ¯ L +
 (Rj ¯ K + wj ¯ L)
wj(    1)
= ¯ L +
 a0
wj(    1)
(12)
So that the number of ﬁrms in country j is given by:
nj =
Ej(    1)wj
wj ¯ L(    1 +  ) +  Rj ¯ K
(13)
16The particularities of this somewhat complicated expression are not cen-
tral. The important aspect of nj is its dependence on interest rates Rj.
From the labor market clearing condition (11), we know that  nj/ Rj =
( nj/ Lj)( Lj/ Rj). From inspection, we know that the ﬁrst term in
parenthesis is negative and the second positive. Thus,  nj/ Rj < 0; as
interest rates decline, the number of ﬁrms rises. Note that the positive sign
of the second partial comes from having introduced ﬁxed costs, as is evident
by the dependence of equation (12) above on a0.
The negative relation between nj and Rj is a key result, central to our
model and its prediction that lower interest rates increase the number of
ﬁrms engaged in trade. Two essential elements are at work behind this
result. First, as capital costs decrease, ﬁrms substitute capital for labor,
thus freeing up labor for more ﬁrms to enter. Second, as entry or ﬁxed costs
decrease, more ﬁrms can a ord to enter. In turn, this decreases output
per ﬁrm.17 The relationships corroborate the IO results mentioned earlier,
whereby as setup costs diminish, concentration declines in favor of more,
smaller ﬁrms. Notice, in fact, that making use of (12) and (10), we can
show that  nj/ a0 < 0 but  xj/ a0 > 0, thereby supporting the notion
that as interest rates decrease (a decline in a0), a greater number of smaller
ﬁrms co-exist. As for the aggregate e ect, per the production function (4),
we conclude unambiguously that trade volume increases, since labor is ﬁxed
and capital increases with a lower interest rate. In addition, more exporting
ﬁrms contribute to total trade increasing.
To ﬁnish the development of the model, we come back to the demand
equation (3) in which we plug our result for nj (13) above. Furthermore, we
make use of the PPP price equation (2) and ﬁrms’ optimal price equation
(8). This yields:
Vi,j =
Ej(    1)wj












This equation draws the line where the rigorous model stops and we begin
to introduce a series of simpliﬁcations in order to arrive at an equation that
is easily testable.
4.3 Towards an augmented gravity equation






j to emphasize the negative relationship with interest rates and
the positive one with wages (for the same reasons but opposite to those dis-
cussed above linking interest rates to the number of ﬁrms). The superscripts
17The appendix breaks up the two e ects mentioned above in some detail, and shows
that in fact output per ﬁrm could increase with a decrease in interest rates, but under
rare conditions.
17capture elasticities of each variable with respect to the number of exporting
ﬁrms.
To simplify the estimation procedure, circumvent unreliable employment
data and minimize the divergence from more traditional gravity equations,
we make an additional simpliﬁcation.18 We assume a constant di erence in
labor productivities between Euro-Area countries and exploit the positive
correlation between output and employment. This allows us to replace Ej
with Yj in the above equation.
To simplify further, we follow Baldwin (2006) which shows, in an inter-
pretation of Flam and Nordstr¨ om (2003)’s methodology, how we can divide
top and bottom of our demand system by Pi and deﬁne  i,j as the real ex-
change rate between country i and j, given by (1/ i,j) a1,j/Pi. This is a
somewhat unconventional deﬁnition of the real exchange rate, which usually
includes Pj in the numerator instead of  a1,j. Yet, to the extent that the
aggregate price is a function of each domestic ﬁrm’s price, which is itself
a function of marginal costs and the markup, our simpliﬁcation does not
introduce notable distortions to the model. This is especially true as we
consider   to be constant across time and countries.
Finally, we follow Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) in deﬁning the
trade cost  i,j as a time independent, country-pair-speciﬁc e ect, capturing
distance, common language, type and e ciency of the legal system and other
such factors commonly found in traditional gravity equations. We call this
parameter  i,j.











1   Yj (15)
which can be linearized for estimation purposes by taking logs of both sides.
This leads to the regression equation:
Vi,j,t =  i,j +  1Yi,t +  2Yj,t +  3 i,j,t +  5 ¯ Rj,t +  6Wj,t 4 +  i,t (16)
where the  ’s are reduced form coe cients and where we use the deﬁnition
¯ Rj,t = (1/6)
 t 1
s=t 6 Rj,s to capture trend interest rates, deemed to be the
relevant measure for entrepreneurs’ decisions (we alter this deﬁnition in ro-
bustness tests) and where Wj,t 4 captures wages one year ago, in line with
ﬁndings that wages tend to stick for about four quarters. The lags on inter-
est rates and wages also allow us to minimize problems of endogeneity with
GDP.
The speciﬁcation above represents our augmented gravity equation. It
has the advantage of being derived from a microfounded model linking inter-
est rates to trade, and to be similar the traditional gravity equations used
18Indeed, there is a great amount of heterogeneity between European countries in clas-
sifying labor, especially as far as it is linked to export-oriented industries.
18widely in the “Rose e ect” literature. Indeed, we can go back and forth
between the two by simply dropping or adding interest rates and wages.
5 Do interest rates explain the break in trade?
5.1 Brief overview of the test
Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) introduces a rigorous statistical test
for end of sample instability in panel data, adapted from a similar test for
time series in Andrews (2003). The particular advantage of the test is its
reliance on an empirically determined distribution of critical values, making
it robust to very few regularity conditions and maintaining power in the face
of a small number of data points after a presumed break. This feature not
only allows for asymptotically valid critical values, but to test a potentially
short-lasting e ect of the Euro.
Below, we use this test to ask if the break in Euro-Area trade remains
despite the additional terms in the augmented gravity regression. But to in-
terpret results, it is useful to review a few cornerstones of the end of sample
test.19 We call the test statistic S, as in Andrews (2003). The statistic is a
type of mean squared error calculated over the sample following the break
point, while imposing constant coe cients throughout the entire sample.
The test consists of comparing the S statistic to analogous statistics, called
S r, taken over the sample prior to the potential break point, in a rolling
window fashion. We reject the Null if S is greater than  % of the S r
statistics, where   is our desired level of signiﬁcance and the distribution
of the S r is determined by empirical subsampling techniques (any assumed
parametrization of the distribution would be erroneous, yielding asymptot-
ically invalid standard errors, given the very small number of observations
after the breakpoint). In essence, the test pivots around the fact that if
instability exists in a series, the errors estimated with coe cients assumed
to be constant over the entire sample will be much “larger” after the break
point than before.
We work with a panel of fourteen EU countries (excluding Greece) and
unilateral trade data. Our dataset includes quarterly observations from 1980
Q1 to 2004 Q4, thus satisfying the necessary condition to carry out the end
of sample test, namely of stationary, ergodic, and large sample series prior
to the potential point of instability. Trade data are from IMF DOTS, while
remaining data are from Eurostat or OECD, as in most studies in the related
literature. We focus on trade within the Euro-Area (Mancini-Gri oli and
Pauwels (2006) consider other control groups made up of EU, but non-Euro-
Area countries). Our null hypothesis is that the coe cients in our regression
remain stable throughout the sample. We label our augmented regression
19Please refer to Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) for details on the test.
19equation above model C and compare it to model A, the baseline gravity
regression in Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006).
5.2 Test results
We ﬁrst control for unit roots in our series, using the Breitung (1997,1999) as
well as Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) procedures. As the results in table
1 show, we cannot reject the Null of a unit root with reasonable signiﬁcance
for any series, although the evidence is somewhat mixed for interest rates.
Table 2 reports test results for two di erent cointegrating vectors corre-
sponding to the two model speciﬁcations mentioned above: models A and
C. On the basis of the Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests, we detect the presence of
cointegration between all series. We view this as an encouraging ﬁnding of
a signiﬁcant long term relationship among our variables, but also as reason
to opt for a unit root in interest rates.
We therefore run our test for a break in trade on an error correction
model (ECM), based on the augmented regression equation above. Mancini-
Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) discuss the speciﬁcation of the ECM model for
panel data as well as some of its properties.
The traditional gravity regression, captured by model A (including just
GDP of country i and j, the real exchange rate and the country-pair-speciﬁc
ﬁxed e ect), indicate the existence of a break in trade between Euro-Area
countries, starting in 1999 Q1 and lasting for 10 quarters (2.5 years). The
Null of stability is rejected with at least 90% signiﬁcance over this entire pe-
riod, with peaks of 99% signiﬁcance for a break length of 7 quarters. Thus,
the panel end-of-sample instability test that we employ replicates quite faith-
fully the results found in the literature, except for a slightly later break date
and especially for the short break length (although some of the most recent
papers are beginning to ﬁnd a short-lasting e ect, see Baldwin (2006) for a
summary). These results are shown in table 3 and are a repetition of those
shown in Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006).
In model C, instead, the break disappears, thereby justifying this pa-
per’s hypothesis of the importance of interest rates. Results are presented
in table 4. For any given break period, the S statistic decreases far below its
equivalent measure under model A with respect to the S r distribution. The
probability of rejecting the null of stability decreases below the 10% level for
all post-break sample periods. Most notably, for the period where the break
is strongest in model A, 1999 Q1 - 2000 Q4, controlling for interest rates
makes the di erence between rejecting (at the 1% level) and not rejecting
the null hypothesis at all. If decreasing interest rates are indeed part of
the story behind the boom in Euro-Area trade, as these results suggest and
according to the theoretical model presented earlier, the rather late break
date with respect to expectations of adopting the Euro may be explained.
Since interest rates started decreasing persistently between 1996 and 1997,
20it is normal that e ects of capital accumulation would only be felt about
two years later, due to the lag between installing and beneﬁtting from new
capital. Indeed, model C includes average interest rates over six quarters
to account for this time to build characteristic. Also, the explanation at-
tached to interest rates conveniently ﬁts the short time span of the break in
trade, as real interest rates can only realistically decrease (or be expected
to decrease) for a limited time. In fact, ﬁgures 1 and 2 show that there
was an important correction in the downward trend in interest rates around
2001 and lasting approximately 6 quarters. This may have contributed to
shortening or abating the perceived trade e ect of the Euro.
We conduct several robustness checks to verify whether the marked de-
crease in interest rates can really explain the structural break found in model
A for Euro-Area data. For these, we use an alternate deﬁnition of average
interest rates. For the tests mentioned above, we had deﬁned ¯ Ri,t to include
6 lags. In tables 5 and 6 below, we show that even if it were to include 4
or 2 lags, we would still fail to reject the null of no structural break. Thus,
altering the lag structure of the average interest rate does not change our
main ﬁndings.
6 Conclusion
The recent trade literature ﬁnds a break in trade among Euro-Area coun-
tries after the adoption of the Euro. Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006)
corroborate this ﬁnding - although pointing to a short-lasting break - with
more powerful econometric tests. But the question remains, what in the new
currency is responsible for boosting trade?
This paper aims to address this question. This paper ﬁrst reviewed
the relevant literature, concluding that the usual suspect - the channel of
exchange rate volatility - does not seem to be very prominent in fostering
trade. This paper then drew hints from a more recent strand of the trade
literature emphasizing the importance of ﬁrm entry as a driver of trade
ﬂuctuations, and particularly the central role played by ﬁxed entry costs.
Could interest rates be seen as tied to these costs?
Empirically, this paper demonstrated that there is reason to believe that
interest rates may be an important link between the Euro and a rise in
trade. Interest rates moved downwards to a signiﬁcant extent across the
Euro-Area as a precondition and consequence of the Euro. Also, this paper
provided evidence of the correlation between interest rates and trade, in a
DOLS panel regression of Euro-Area trade in the last twenty years.
Given such evidence, this paper proposed a simple theoretical model
linking trade to the number of exporting ﬁrms, and these to ﬁxed entry
costs themselves tied to interest rates. Conveniently, this model simpliﬁed
to a regression equation, of a form very similar to standard gravity equations,
21but in particular including interest rates as an additional variable.
This paper ended by showing that the same test for end-of-sample break
as presented in Mancini-Gri oli and Pauwels (2006) no longer found evidence
of a break in Euro-Area trade. Thus, interest rates could well be one of the
variables missing from the standard gravity equation whose errors jump after
the introduction of the Euro. From the perspective of accession countries,
this is not very good news, as it gives a microfounded explanation for why
the trade e ect of adopting the Euro might indeed be short-lasting.
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26A Deriving DOLS
To understand the derivation of the DOLS estimator and the source of the
bias it aims to adjust, it is helpful to refer to the standard representation of
the panel cointegrated regression, presented possibly most clearly in Mark
and Sul (2002):
yi,t =  i +  
 
xi,t + ui,t
where (1,  
 
) is the cointegrating vector between yi,t and xi,t. Furthermore,
the error ui,t is independent across i but possibly dependent across t,  i are
individual speciﬁc ﬁxed e ects, that can be augmented to include time e ects
as well, and xi,t is a vector of non-stationary regressors given by:
xi,t = xi,t 1 +  i,t
This implies, of course, that yi,t = yi,t 1+ 
 
 i,t+ ui,t, namely that the
dependent variable is also cointegrated. The setup yields two forms of bias.
First, the serial correlation in the errors, and second the endogeneity of the
regressors, due to the non-zero correlation between ui,t and at most p leads
and lags of  i,t. To correct for endogeneity, project ui,t onto the leads and











 xi,t+j +  i,t
where  i,t is by construction orthogonal to the leads and lags of  i,t.
Replacing this result into the regression equation yields:







 xi,t+j +  i,t
which can be estimated by ﬁxed e ects to yield the DOLS estimator. Note
that the equation above is a close analog of the more familiar error correction
form of time series models.20
B Breaking down the interest rate e ect on the
number of ﬁrms
We come back on one of the main result of the paper, namely that  nj/ Rj <
0 to give greater details on the breakdown of this e ect. We ﬁrst note that
we can solve for the number of exporting ﬁrms in country j as a negative
20See Baltagi and Kao (2000) and references mentioned there for reﬁnements and asymp-
totic properties of this estimator.function of Lj, the optimal number of workers employed in each ﬁrm, as
in equation (13) in the text. Second, the solution for Lj is expressed as a
function of Rj and xj, as in equation (6). Finally, xj, or output per ﬁrm,
is also a function of Rj, as noticeable in equation (10). Thus, the ﬁrst and









Inspection of equation (13) tells us that the ﬁrst partial is negative. By
making use of the second and third observations above, the second partial
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where we can refer to the ﬁrst term on the right hand side as the factor
substitution e ect and the second as the ﬁrm size e ect. Indeed, as interest
rates decrease, ﬁrms substitute capital for labor in production, as captured
by the ﬁrst term, which, by inspection, is positive. This is important to free
up workers for the entry of more ﬁrms. But also, as interest rates decrease,
ﬁrm size is a ected. But whether size increases or decreases is technically
ambiguous, although regular conditions imply that the size should decrease
with a drop in interest rates. But whatever the e ect on ﬁrm size, we know
from equation (12) in the text that Lj decreases with lower interest rates,
thus unambiguously increasing the number of ﬁrms.
Intuitively, as interest rates decrease, ﬁrm size will decrease with the
number of ﬁrms (as discussed in the text). But variable costs also decrease,
thus lower price and boosting output. A glance at the equation determining
(10) will make it clear that a0 and a1, which both depend on Rj, have
opposite e ects on xj.
Digging a little into the mathematics of this e ect allows so see these
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where the e ects of a0 and a1 clearly work in opposite directions.
So that the ﬁrm entry e ect dominate, and thus ﬁrm size decrease with
lower interest rates, the above equation boils down to a condition on the
relative size of ﬁxed costs:
 xj
 Rj
> 0 i  Rj ¯ K >
1    
 
wj ¯ LWeights on production functions are notoriously di cult to estimate,
given the endogeneity of capital and labor to changes in productivity and
the di culty of measuring capital utilization. Simple regressions often ﬁnd a
coe cient close to zero on capital, since the capital stock, commonly used to
evaluate capital used in production, does not change much over time. Other
estimations, using electricity consumption as a proxy for capital utilization
ﬁnd a coe cient on capital of around 0.6 and one of 0.4 on labor.21 Given
this latter estimate, the above condition suggests that the ﬁxed costs due to
capital must be at least 1.5 those stemming from labor, a requirement that
should be easily satisﬁed as ﬁxed costs are typically dominated by the setup
of capital. The fact that ﬁrm size varies negatively with the number of ﬁrms,
which rises as ﬁxed costs decrease, rejoins the basic dynamics emphasized
in the IO literature, linking concentration to set-up costs and average prices
to competitive intensity.
Thus, coming back to equation (18) above, we conclude that as interest
rates decrease, labor per ﬁrm decreases due to the substitution e ect and
the ﬁrm size e ect, which is likely to be dominated by the ﬁrm entry e ect.
Together, these contribute to unambiguously making  Lj/ Rj positive and
thus  nj/ Rj negative, as explained in the text.
21See Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995), or Basu and Fernald (1997).C Real interest rates in the EU

























































































































































Figure 1: Average real interest rates (over six quarters) were relatively stable
(just below 10% on average) until about 1996, when a noticeable downward
trend began. In four years, real interest rates lost about 600 basis points,
and four years later, after a further 200 basis point decrease, were at their


















































































































































Figure 2: Year-on-year growth of average real interest rates hovered slightly
below zero until about 1996, after which it remained decisively negative, in
the order of  10% or more.
D Empirical evidence
Table 1: Unit Root tests for the Euro Area series
Breitung test IPS test
intercept int. & slope intercept int. & slope
Stat Prob. Stat Prob. Stat Prob. Stat Prob.
Vt -1.05 0.15 1.42 0.92 3.09 1.00 -7.62 0.00
Yt -0.32 0.37 1.89 0.97 0.76 1.00 0.17 0.57
wt 0.23 0.59 -0.45 0.33 3.22 1.00 -1.63 0.05
Rt -1.08 0.13 -2.47 0.006 12.6 1.00 2.87 0.99Table 2: Pedroni’s (1999) Cointegration Results
Speciﬁcation     statistic     statistic
(A) 12.6 -26.5
(C) 8.8 -22.3
Table 3: Baseline Model (A)
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1   2000Q3 61.8 82 67.4 53.5
1999Q1   2000Q4 73.1 72.8 64.4 55
1999Q1   2001Q1 50 69.5 61.4 51.6
1999Q1   2001Q3 50.2 65.4 56.9 48.9
1999Q1   2002Q1 36.9 62.5 50.7 44.7
1999Q1   2004Q4 22 87.9 66.4 54.6
Table 4: Augmented Gravity Model (C)
Break Period S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1   2000Q3 51.9 119 99.2 74.1
1999Q1   2000Q4 66.4 105 92.3 81.3
1999Q1   2001Q1 45.8 106 92.6 72.3
1999Q1   2001Q3 46.6 98.8 89.2 82
1999Q1   2002Q1 39.6 96.7 81.7 65.9
1999Q1   2004Q4 37.8 114 95.5 79.7
Table 5: Average Interest Rate with 4 lags
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1   2000Q4 62.4 101 89.5 75
1999Q1   2001Q3 42.8 93 89.5 72.5
1999Q1   2002Q3 37.4 86.1 77.2 72.2
Table 6: Average Interest Rate with 2 lags
Span S Sr: 1% Sr: 5% Sr: 10%
1999Q1   2000Q4 67.9 108 87.1 68.2
1999Q1   2001Q3 47.3 95.7 88.3 72.1
1999Q1   2002Q3 41.1 90.8 78.6 71.4Table 7: DOLS Results for 1980Q1   1999Q1




(A) 1.09 0.37 -0.05
(44.4) (15.2) (-2.4)
(C) 0.92 0.35 -0.02 0.49 -0.11
(36.9) (14.8) (-1.1) (12.7) (-11.0)
(C) 0.91 0.35 -0.02 0.49 -0.12
(36.6) (14.8) (-0.8) (12.8) (-11.31)
(C) 0.94 0.36 -0.06 0.52 -0.11
(37.4) (14.8) (-2.7) (13.8) (-10.8)
t-statistics appear in parentheses. The superscript on ¯ Rj,t indicates the number of lags in
the deﬁnition of average interest rates. The p leads and lags used in the DOLS correction
terms (see appendix A for details) is 4 in all cases, except for ¯ R
6
j,t and wj,t 4 where we
use p = 2 since there are already su cient lags in the deﬁnition of the variables.
Table 8: ECM Results for 1980Q1   1999Q1
Speciﬁcation  Yi,t  Yj,t   i,j,t    i,t 1  wj,t 4  ¯ Rj,t
(A) 0.79 0.36 -0.03 -0.14
(14.8) (6.7) (-0.35) (-24.3)
(C) 0.74 0.4 -0.01 -0.17 0.005 -0.06
(12.9) (7) (-0.16) (-24.8) (0.04) (-2.2)
t-
statistics appear in parentheses.